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A geometric approach, analogous to the approach used in the ad-
ditive case, is proposed to determine the conditional expectation with
non-additive probabilities. The conditional expectation is then ap-
plied for (i) updating the probability when new information becomes
available; and (ii) de¯ning the notion of independence of non-additive
probabilities and Nash equilibrium.
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The issue of updating non-additive probabilities (Schmeidler (1989)) has been
given extensive attention. Several theories have been proposed for the condi-
tional probability in the non-additive case (see Dempster (1967,1968), Shafer
(1976), Smets (1986), Gilboa (1989), Chateauneuf and Ja®ray (1989), Fagin
and Halpern (1989), Halpern and Tuttle (1989), Ja®ray (1990), Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1993), Denneberg (1994) and Sarin and Wakker (1998)). Most
suggest that the probability of an event B conditioned on an event A de-
pends not only on the probabilities of A;B and A \ B, as in the traditional
Bayes formula, but also on the probabilities of other events, such as A \ B
and (A \ B) [ A. Once the conditional probability given A is de¯ned, say,
P(¢jA), one may de¯ne the conditional expectation of a function X (e.g., a
state-of-nature-dependent payo®, derived from a certain action { an act in
the terminology of Savage (1954)), given the event A, by simply integrating
the restriction of X over A with respect to the conditional probability P(¢jA).
This method of calculating the conditional expectation is conceptually
inconsistent for the following reason. While the conditional probability of B
with respect to A depends on the behavior of B outside of A, the conditional
expectation of X, given A, depends only on the behavior of X over A. Thus,
two functions may be signi¯cantly di®erent on the complement of A, and yet,
as long as they coincide on A, their conditional expectations are equal.
A similar method of calculating the conditional expectation is to restrict
the probability and the function to the conditioned event and to consider only
the restricted items. More precisely, the conditional expectation is de¯ned
as the Choquet integral (see Choquet (1953-1954)) of the restricted function
with respect to the normalized restricted probability. This method implies
that the derived conditional probability of an event B, given A, depends only
on the probability of A\B and of A. It may also imply that the conditional
expectation of a function X on A is equal to its conditional expectation over
A and yet, both di®er from the Choquet integral of X.
1In this paper, we present a geometric approach, inspired by the theory of
additive probabilities, which suggests a theory of conditional expectation that
does not pass through the conditional probabilities. Rather, the conditional
probability is a by-product.
The conditional expectation of a function X, given a ¯eld of events, say,
F, will be de¯ned as the closest (in some formal sense) function, which
is F-measurable. This represents a conservative attitude: the conditional
expectation of a function X is another function that ¯rst, is compatible with
the information (modeled by a ¯eld of events) and second, is the closest to
the original one.
Here, in the case of non-additive probabilities, we adopt the same ap-
proach. There are several ways, though, to borrow this idea; all are equiva-
lent in the additive case. It turns out that only a few, and the one presented
in Section 6 among them, maintain the following two desirable properties:
(a) If X is F-measurable, then the expectation conditioned on F is X.
(b) The expectation of a function conditioned on the trivial ¯eld is equal to
its (Choquet) integral.
Some points are worth noticing. The conditional probability of an event
B with respect to (w.r.t.) another event A, is the expectation of 1 lB (the
characteristic function of B) conditioned on the ¯eld generated by A (which
consists of Á;­;A and A). However, if the complement of A is split di®erently
(to more than just A), then the conditional expectation on A itself is typically
di®erent. In other words, the conditional probability of B, given A, depends
on the partition of A. This observation calls for a re-examination of the
concept of probability in the non-additive case.
The original probability and the conditional one must be of the same
nature. In the case of additive probabilities no problem arises: the condi-
tionals do not depend on the entire partition of the space. The conditional
probability depends on the conditioned event only, and therefore it is a nu-
2meric probability, like the original one. In the non-additive case, by contrast,
the conditional probability depends on the whole partition and is not real-
valued. Rather, it is a function: the conditional probability of B, given the
partition P, is a P-measurable function. That is, the conditional probability
is typically vector-valued. The unconditional probability must, therefore, be
considered as a special case of the conditional probability, given the trivial
¯eld, and hence, real-valued.
All of the above suggest that the probability must be de¯ned as a vector
whose dimension depends on the partition under consideration.
In case the conditional expectation is not computed directly, but rather
through the conditional probability, an undesirable phenomenon occurs: the
conditional expectation of 1 lB, given A, does not coincide with the probability
of B given A. When computed directly, as hereby proposed, this does not
happen. Moreover, due to continuity, if a function is close to 1 lB, then its
conditional expectation, given A, is an approximation to the probability of
B, given A.
Under some existing updating schemes it may turn out that the condi-
tional probabilities of B, given A, and of B, given A, are both less than some
constant, and yet, the probability of B is greater than this constant. Under
the updating scheme proposed here this cannot occur. This feature extends
to the conditional expectation. The fact that the conditional expectation
of a function is uniformly greater than a certain constant implies that the
integral of this function is greater than the same constant. In particular, if,
given any event in the informational partition, an act is valued, say, 7, then
this act is unconditionally valued 7.
This approach is used to de¯ne Nash equilibrium with non-additive prob-
abilities. In a strategic context, Nash equilibrium involves two conditions.
First, the players play independently, and thus, their play induces indepen-
dent probabilities over the product of their action spaces. Second, each player
plays his or her best response, given his or her choice and given other players'
3actions.
In case the mixed actions of the players are non-additive, the ¯rst condi-
tion calls for a de¯nition of independence of non-additive probabilities de¯ned
on a product space. Using the geometric approach suggested here, this has a
natural solution: the mixed actions of the players are independent if there is a
measure over the set of all joint actions such that (i) the marginal probability
over every player's actions coincides with the players' mixed action; and (ii)
the players can induce nothing about other players' actions from their own.
Only through conditional probability can players learn about others' actions
from their own. Therefore, condition (ii) of independence can be conveyed
more formally as follows. There exists a probability over the product space
(typically, not the product probability) such that the probability of player
i playing an action in a set B coincides with the conditional probability of B,
given the partition induced by what player i knows (i.e., his or her actions).
Section 7 elaborates on this subject.
The second condition of Nash equilibrium refers to incentive compatibil-
ity. It states that each player plays his or her best response to other players'
actions. However, the payo® given to a player when he or she plays an action,
is nothing but the conditional payo®, with respect to the independent proba-
bility (over the product space), given that action. Therefore, both conditions
of Nash equilibrium require the concept of conditional expectation provided
here.
2 A Motivating Example
Browsers in a car dealership were asked to ¯ll out a short questionnaire. The
information they had to provide was whether they had bought a new car
during the last three years (indicated as \frequent buyer") or not (indicated
as \non-frequent buyer"), and the number of years they had spent in school.
Due to the limited patience of the average browser, the questionnaire was
4designed to elicit information in steps: First, whether she/he had purchased
a new car in the last three years, then whether the number of years in school
was between 0 and 12 or greater than 12, and ¯nally to indicate the number
of school years in one of the following ranges: 0¡8, 9¡12, 13¡15 and 15+.
It turned out that 1000 customers ¯lled out the form. Some, as ex-
pected, failed to provide all the information. Others skipped the second step
and indicated, for instance, that they had spent between 0 and 8 years in
school, without marking the 00 ¡ 120 category. Still other customers checked
two complementing categories, such as 13 ¡ 15 and 15+. The less educated
browsers were the most impatient and frequently failed to hand in fully an-
swered forms. The number of checks in the various categories is given in the
following table.
Years in School
0 ¡ 12 12+
0 ¡ 8 9 ¡ 12 13 ¡ 15 15 +
frequent-buyers 200 300
10 100 200 100
non-frequent buyers 310 150
100 200 101 102
Number of checks in each category
Aside from the information provided by the table, it is known that the
total number of frequent buyers is 500, of non-frequent buyers is 490, of
the category \0-12" is 510, and of \12+" is 480. Finally, categories whose
intersection is not mentioned did not get any joint check.
Based on the above information one can derive a non-additive probability
as follows. The probability of a category is the relative frequency of the checks
5in this category. The same applies to an explicitly indicated intersection of
categories (e.g., non-frequent buyers who have less than or equal to 12 years
in school). Intersections that are not mentioned have zero probability. As
for the union of categories, the probability is the sum of the probabilities of
the categories that comprise the union. For instance, the probability of the
non-frequent buyers who have less than or equal to 12 years in school is 310
1000,
the probability of the non-frequent buyers is 490
1000 and the probability of the
union of those non-frequent buyers who have less than or equal to 12 years in




This example is aimed at convincing the reader that the probability of
a \non-frequent buyer", given the event \0-12", depends on all the informa-
tion available. In particular, the conditional probability when the available
information is the partition \0-12" and \12+" di®ers from the conditional
probability when the available information is the partition \0-12", \13-15"
and \15+".
Denote the partition consisting of the events \0-12" and \12+" by F1
and the partition consisting of \0-12", \13-15" and \15+" by F2. For the
sake of example, consider a new customer who ¯lled out a questionnaire and
indicated that she/he has spent between 0 and 12 years in school. What
is the conditional probability that she/he has bought a new car in the last
three years?
Suppose that the information available is F1. Based on it, the size of
category \0-12" can be directly estimated as 510, which is the total number
of checks in the category \0-12" { an event in F1. Alternatively, one can
use the dual estimation (the complement of the complement), and obtain
1000 ¡ 480 = 520 (since 480 is the total number of checks in the category
\12+", which is also an event in F1). Notice that had the table re°ected the
true situation, the two estimation methods would result in the same number.
Due to the distorted information the estimations are di®erent. Dempster
(1967) and Shafer (1976) used the dual method, but there is no convincing
6reason to choose one over the other.
Now assume that the information available is wider, say, F2. There are
two additional numbers known: 301 { the number of checks in \13-15",
and 202 { the number of checks in \15+". Taking these numbers at face
value, using the dual estimation, one would estimate the size of \0-12" as
1000¡301¡202 = 497. Thus, the additional information results in a di®erent
estimation.
The question arises as to whether one should ignore the previously known
¯gure of 450, or maybe the newly known numbers and if not, how should
one weigh all the ¯gures together? Furthermore, if all the numbers in the
complement of \0-12" are considered why discriminate against the direct
estimation? The method introduced in the sequel takes into account all the
information available.
Hopefully, the reader is now curious enough to know how.
3 The Geometric Approach in the Additive
Case
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the underlying probability
space, ­, is ¯nite. Let P be an additive probability. We denote by D the
¯eld containing all subsets of ­. A generic sub¯eld of D will be denoted by
F. If F is the trivial ¯eld (containing Á and ­ only) it will be denoted as T .
The ¯eld that consists of Á;­;A and the complement of A, A, is denoted by
FA.
Assume that X is a random variable and let F be a ¯eld. It turns out
that X can be written as X = Y + X?, where Y is F-measurable (i.e., Y is




?dP = 0 for all F-measurable variables Z :
The conditional expectation E(XjF) is equal to Y . In other words, X =
7E(XjF)+X?. In the appropriate space E(XjF) is the closest F-measurable
function to X. More precisely, denote by M(F) the set of all F-measurable
variables. Then,
(2) E(XjF) = argminY 2M(F)
Z
(X ¡ Y )
2dP :
In other words, Y is the closest, w.r.t. to the `2 norm variable in M(F),
to X. Stated di®erently, E(XjF) is the projection of X to the subspace (of
variables) M(F).
Example 1
Consider an additive probability P and an event B. Let 1 lB be the charac-
teristic function of B. A T -measurable function is a constant, say, ®. Now,
R
(1 lB ¡ ®)2dP = (1 ¡ ®)2P(B) + ®2P(B). The minimum of this expres-
sion is attained, by equating the derivative to zero, at ® = P(B). Thus,
E(1 lBjT ) = P(B). If instead, the ¯eld is FA for some event A, then an
FA-measurable function is ® on A and ¯ on A. Let Y be such a function.
Thus,
R
(1 lB ¡ Y )2dP = ®2P(A ¡ B) + (1 ¡ ®)2P(A \ B) + (1 ¡ ¯)2P(A \





P(A) . These are exactly the conditional probabilities of B, given A,
and of B, given A, respectively.
4 The Non-Additive Case - Preliminary At-
tempts
This section provides the various considerations that might guide one before
de¯ning conditional expectation. Let P be a monotonic non-additive prob-
ability. That is, P(;) = 0, P(­) = 1 and if A µ B, then P(A) · P(B).
We now use the geometric approach presented in the previous section. This
approach can be interpreted in various ways. This section introduces some
8possible, however imperfect interpretations. The impatient reader is advised
to skip it and move directly to Section ??, where the de¯nition proposed by
this paper is provided.




























In the case where P is non-additive and the integral is understood as the
Choquet integral, no two of these methods are equivalent.
Whatever method is adopted, it seems natural to require that the condi-
tional expectation would satisfy the following two desirable properties:
(A1) E(XjF) = X if X is F ¡ measurable:
(A2) E(XjT ) =
Z
XdP:
(A1) states that if X is already measurable with respect to the ¯eld F,
the expectation of X, conditional on F, is X itself. (A2) states that with
respect to the trivial ¯eld, that is, when no information is available, then the
conditional expectation coincides with the Choquet integral of X.
9Example 2
­ = fa;bg, P(a) = P(b) = 0; P(ab) = 1. X(a) = 1; X(b) = 10. Let
Y (a) = ® and Y (b) = ¯. That is, Y is D-measurable. Then, adopting
method (III), one obtains, when ® < ¯,
R
Y 2 ¡ 2
R
XY = ®2 ¡ 2®. The
minimum, which is ¡1, is obtained when ® = 1 and 1 < ¯. If, on the other
hand, ¯ · ® then
R
Y 2 ¡ 2
R
XY = ¯2 ¡ 2min(®;10¯). The minimum of
¡100 is achieved when ¯ = 10 and ® = 100. Thus, the global minimum
is obtained when Y (a) = 100 and Y (b) = 10. The function at which the
minimum is obtained satis¯es, in particular Y 6= X. This is not desirable,
since the ¯eld considered is D, the same ¯eld generated by X itself.
We now follow method (IV) and compute argmaxY 2M(D)
R
2XY ¡Y 2dP.
One can see that,
(2XY ¡ Y
2)(!) · 2 ¢ X(!)X(!) ¡ X
2(!) ; ! = a;b :
Thus, argmaxY 2M(D)
R
2XY ¡Y 2dP = X. In other words, if method (IV) is
adopted, then the conditional expectation with respect to the ¯eld generated
by X is X itself.
In this example method (III) does not satisfy (A1) while method (IV)
does.
Example 3
Let ­ = fa;bg; P(a) = P(b) = 0:6; X(a) = 0; X(b) = 1. Thus,
R
X = 0:6.
Adopting the method (I), if Y = ® then
R
(X¡®)2dP = ®2+[(1¡®)2¡®2]0:6
when ® · 1
2 and
R
(X ¡ ®)2dP = (1 ¡ ®)2 + [®2 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)2]0:6 when ® ¸ 1
2.
The minimum when ® · 1
2 is attained at ® = 1
2 and when ® ¸ 1
2 it is also
attained at ® = 1
2. The global minimum is therefore achieved by ® = 1
2.
Thus, argminY 2M(T )
R
X2 +Y 2 ¡2XY dP 6=
R
XdP and(A2) is not satis¯ed
by method (I).
10It turns out that none of the methods described above satis¯es both (A1)
and (A2).
Another desirable property of the conditional expectation is continuity.
When the conditional expectation is calculated by an additive probability,
induced by the original non-additive one, there is a lack of continuity. By
contrast, all reasonable methods inspired by the geometric approach imply
continuity. Since E(¢jF) may be a set of solutions, the full formal meaning
of the following (A5) will be given in the next section. (The skip from (A1)
and (A2) to (A5) is for the sake of consistency with Section 6.)
(A5) E(¢jF) is continuous.
It turns out that the conditional expectation, if de¯ned by methods (I)
or (II), satis¯es (A5).
Methods (I) and (II) also satisfy,
(A6) If c is a positive constant, then the conditional expectation of cX is c
times the conditional expectation of X.
However, due to the non-additivity of the underlying probability, these
methods do not satisfy,
(A7)¡ If c is a constant then the conditional expectation of c + X is c plus
the conditional expectation of X.
5 Updating Non-Additive Probabilities { An
Illustration
Any de¯nition of the conditional expectation implies a de¯nition of the con-
ditional probability of an event given any ¯eld. Consider two events B and
A. The conditional probability P(BjA) is the updating of the probability of
the event A when the information received is according to the ¯eld FA. That
11is, if ! 2 A is realized then the information received is A. Otherwise, the
information is the complement of A. Formally, the conditional probability
P(BjA) is de¯ned as the value of E(1 lBjFA) on A.
In order to illustrate the main idea, we provide here the de¯nition of the
conditional probability of an event B, given the ¯eld FA, induced by method
(IV ).







2)P(A [ B) + 2®P(B)
+ (2¯ ¡ ¯
2 ¡ 2® + ®
2)P(A \ B);
when ® · ¯. It attains its maximum at the points
(4) ® =
P(B) ¡ P(A \ B)
P(A [ B) ¡ P(A \ B)
and ¯ =
P(A \ B)
1 + P(A \ B) ¡ P(A [ B)
:
(4) is consistent with ® · ¯ if and only if ® · P(B). If P(B) < ®, then
the maximum of
R
2XY ¡ Y 2dP occurs when ¯ · ®.






1 + P(A \ B) ¡ P(A [ B)
and ¯ =
P(B) ¡ P(A \ B)
P(A [ B) ¡ P(A \ B)
:
(5) is consistent with ¯ · ® if and only if ¯ · P(B).
To summarize, there may be three types of maxima: (4), (5) or ® = ¯ =
P(B). Notice that (4) and (5) may both be consistent. In this case, the
solution is the maximal one.
Example 4
Let P(B) = 0:1, P(B \ A) = P(B \ A) = 0:05, P(B [ A) = P(B [ A) = 3
4.
In this case E(1 lBjFA) is either 1
14 on A and 1
6 on A or vice versa: 1
6 on A
and 1
14 on A. Thus, there are two solutions that di®er from each other on a
set whose probability is 1.
12Let us compute
R
1 lB ¡ E(XjFA)dP. It is equal to ¡1

















14 ¡ 1 + 1
6):05 = 0.
This example suggests the following:
Proposition 1 For every two events A and B one obtains
R
1 lB¡E(1 lBjFA)dP =
0.
Proof. Whether the solution is (4), (5) or ® = ¯ = P(B), a direct
computation proves the assertion.
6 The Conditional Expectation
6.1 The de¯nition and examples
The conditional expectation of the function X, given a ¯eld F, is an F-
measurable function that satis¯es some properties. We would like to de¯ne
the conditional expectation of X, given the ¯eld F, as argminY 2M(F)
R
X2+
Y 2 ¡ 2XY dP. The problem is that according to this method (A2) is not
always satis¯ed. The correction of this °aw is performed as follows.
Denote X(!) = min
!02F(!)
X(!0), where F(!) is the atom of F containing !.
Similarly denote X(!) = max
!02F(!)
X(!0). Let N(X;F) be the subset of those
Y 2 M(F) which satisfy
R
X ¡ Y dP = 0 and X(!) · Y (!) · X(!) for
every !.
Lemma 1 N(X;F) is a non-empty compact set.
Proof. Consider a ¯eld F whose atoms are A1;:::;Ak. Any Y 2 M(F)
is a vector (®1;:::;®k) in I R
k. That is, Y obtains the value ®i on the atom Ai,
i = 1;:::;k. Thus,
R
(X¡Y )dP is a function of (®1;:::;®k), say '(®1;:::;®k).
By the de¯nition of the Choquet integral, I R
k can be split into a ¯nite number
of regions, where
13a. Each region has a non-empty interior; and
b. At each region, '(®1;:::;®k) is a summation of k polynomials of degree





where qi(®i) is a polynomial of degree 1. Thus, ' is piece-wise linear. More-
over, it is continuous and monotonic. In other words, if ® and ¯ are two
vectors in I R
k and ® is greater than or equal to ¯ on every coordinate,
then '(®) ¸ '(¯). Thus, N(X;F) is a closed and bounded set. Due to
monotonicity and the facts
R
(X ¡ X)dP ¸ 0 and
R
(X ¡ X)dP · 0, we
conclude that N(X;F) is not empty and that there is Y 2 N(X;F) such
that X(!) · Y (!) · X(!) for every !.
De¯nition 1 The conditional expectation of X with respect to F, denoted
E(XjF), is a random variable Y 2 N(X;F) that minimizes
R
(X ¡ Y )2dP:
Formally,
E(XjF) 2 argminY 2N(X;F)
Z
(X ¡ Y )
2dP:
In words, we say that Y is a conditional expectation of X given F if it
is an F-measurable function which minimizes the integral of the di®erence
between X and Y squared, among the functions Y that have two properties:
(i) Y is bounded between the minimum and the maximum of X in each atom
of F; and (ii) the integral of the di®erence between X and Y is equal to zero.




(X ¡ Y )
2dP:
We say that Y is E(XjF) if Y solves this minimization problem.
146.2 Updating non-additive probabilities
The conditional probability of B given A, P(BjA), is de¯ned as the value
of E(1 lBjFA) on A.
Example 5
Let A be an event containing B. E(1 lBjFA) is ® on A and 0 on A (since
1 lB = 0 on A ). The equation
R
1 lB ¡E(1 lBjFA)dP = 0 has only one solution,
® =
P(B)




1 ¡ P(A [ B) + P(B)
:
Note that P(BjA) depends also on the probability of the event A[B. Note






Let C = B [ A, where B µ A. The conditional expectation, E(1 lBjFA), is ®





Let ­ = fa;b;c;dg. Consider the following non-additive probability: P(a;c;d) =
1
2, P(­) = 1 and 0 otherwise. Suppose that X is 0 on b and d, X(a) = 9 and
X(c) = 1. The conditional expectation, E(XjFfa;bg), is ® on fa;bg and ¯ on
fc;dg. ® and ¯ must satisfy
R
X ¡ E(XjFfa;bg) = 0. Thus, ( when ® ¸ ¯)
¡® + 1
2(® ¡ ¯) = 0. It means that ¯ = ® = 0. For the sake of completeness
one should also check the case of ® · ¯. When doing so, one reaches the
same solution.
15Example 8
Consider the previous example with the change that the probability of any




implies that when ® ¸ ¯, ® = 1




(X ¡ E(XjFfa;bg))2 = ¯2 + 1
4((1 ¡ ¯)2 ¡ ¯2). The minimum is
therefore obtained when ¯ = 1
4 and ® = 1
4. Thus, the conditional expectation
is a constant (and therefore necessarily coincides with the integral { see (A9)
ahead.)
Example 9
Consider the previous example with the following change: the probability of
any set containing fag, unless otherwise indicated, is 1
8. When ® ¸ ¯,
R
X¡
E(XjFfa;bg) = ¡®+ 1
2(®¡¯)+ 1
4 + 1
8(9¡®¡1+¯) = 0. Thus, ® = 2¡ 3
5¯.
Now, if ¯ ¸ 1
2, then
R
(X ¡E(XjFfa;bg))2 = (1¡¯)2+ 1
8((9¡®)2¡(1¡¯)2).
Subject to the constraint, ® = 2¡ 3
5¯, the minimum is achieved when ¯ = 1
2
and ® = 1:7. However, if ¯ · 1
2, then
R
(X ¡ E(XjFfa;bg))2 = ¯2 + 1
4((1 ¡
¯)2 ¡ ¯2) + 1
8((9 ¡ ®)2 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)2). This expression attains its minimum
within the allowable range ( 0 · ¯ · 1
2) at ¯ = 0 and ® = 2. Out of the two
solutions the latter attains the global minimum. Therefore E(XjFfa;bg) is 2
on fa;bg and 0 on fc;dg.
6.4 The properties of the conditional expectation
We now list the properties of the conditional expectation as de¯ned above.
Since E(XjF) is typically not a singleton, in what follows "E(XjF)" should
be interpreted as "there is a function in E(XjF)".
(A1) If X is F-measurable, then E(XjF) coincides with X.





(X ¡ E(XjF))dP = 0.
16(A4) E(X ¡ E(XjF)jF) = 0.
(A5) E(XjF) is continuous in X and in P. That is, for every X;P and
" > 0 there is ± > 0 such that if jX ¡ X0j < ± and jP ¡ P 0j < ±, then
jEP(XjF) ¡ EP0(X0jF)j < ".
(A6) If c is a non-negative constant, then E(cXjF) = cE(XjF).
(A7) If Z is F-measurable, then E(Z + XjF) = Z + E(XjF).
(A8) E(XjF) is, on every atom of F, between the minimum and the max-
imum of X.
(A9) If P is additive, then E(XjF) coincides with the additive conditional
expectation.
(A10) If F1 is ¯ner than F2 (F2 µ F1) and E(XjF1) is F2-measurable, then
E(XjF1) = E(XjF2).
Theorem 1 The conditional expectation always exists and satis¯es (A1)-
(A10).
Proof. Similarly to ' in the proof of Lemma 1 one can de¯ne Ã(®1;:::;®k)
as the value of
R
(X ¡ Y )2dP. Due to Lemma 1, N(X;F) is a non-empty
and compact set. Thus, the conditional expectation is the set of the points
in the non-empty set, N(X;F), at which the continuous function Ã attains
its minimum. Therefore, the existence of the conditional expectation is guar-
anteed.
(A1), (A2) and (A3) are assured because the solutions are in N(X;F).
By negation, assume that (A4) is incorrect. It means that 0 is not a solution
for E(X ¡ E(XjF)jF): Thus, there is Z 2 N(X ¡ E(XjF);F) such that
R
(X ¡E(XjF)¡Z)2dP is strictly smaller than
R
(X ¡E(XjF))2dP. Since
E(XjF) is F-measurable, min
!02F(!)
(X ¡ E(XjF))(!0) · Z(!) · max
!02F(!)
(X ¡
17E(XjF))(!0) for every ! implies that min
!02F(!)
X(!0) · (Z + E(XjF))(!) ·
max
!02F(!)
X(!0) for every !. Therefore, Z + E(XjF) 2 N(X;F). Hence,
E(XjF) does not solve the problem minY 2N(X;F)
R
(X ¡ Y )2dP:
(A5) follows directly from the continuity of Ã and the fact that the
Choquet integral of a non-negative (non-positive) function is smaller (greater)
than or equal to zero.
(A6) holds because for every non-negative constant c, N(cX;F) = cN(X;F).
As for (A7), if Z is F-measurable, then N(Z + X;F) = Z + N(X;F).
(A8) is due to the de¯nition.
To show (A9), consider an additive probability P. The E(XjF) solves
the problem minY 2M(F)
R
X2 +Y 2 ¡2XY dP. It turns out that the solution
is in N(X;F). Thus, minimizing over the set N(X;F) does not change the
solution. Therefore, the de¯nition adopted here coincides with the regular
conditional expectation in the case of additive probabilities.
Since (A10) is obvious, the proof is complete.
Remark 2 a. In additive probabilities what characterizes E(XjF) is the







(A4) is equivalent to this requirement.
b. (A7) applies also to a constant function Z.
c. (A3) and monotonicity of the Choquet integral imply that if E(XjF) ¸ c,
where c is a constant, then
R
X ¸ c. Stated more generally, if Z is F-
measurable and E(XjF) ¸ Z, then
R
X ¡ Z ¸ 0. A similar assertion
obviously holds with the inverse inequality. When X is interpreted as
an act, it implies that if on every atom of the informational partition,
X is valued more than some constant, say, 7, then the global \worth"
of this act is at least 7.
18d. The lack of additivity must fully account for the entire lack of informa-
tion, as well as for ambiguity. Once these are captured, the use of the
non-additive probability, for the sake of updating for instance, must be
as of a probability function. In particular, whenever a certain act is
equivalent to, say, 7, regardless of the prevailing event, the act itself
ought to be equivalent to 7.
e. An immediate consequence of this is the following assertion. If E(XjF)
is a constant, then this constant is the Choquet integral of X. Of par-
ticular interest is the case where X = 1 lB and F = FA. In this case
the assertion means that if P(BjA) = P(BjA), then both are equal to
P(B).
Other updating rules may result, for instance, in P(BjA) = P(BjA) =
1
3 and yet, P(B) = 1
2. This phenomenon cannot happen if the con-
ditional probability is de¯ned by the conditional expectation as hereby
suggested.
f. In my view, c. and d. are among the main reasons why one cannot
restrict attention only to the conditioned event. Rather, one should
treat the whole partition, including all its atoms, simultaneously.
g. (A9) can be conceived as an inverse time consistency. Suppose that con-
ditioning on a ¯ner ¯eld results in a function which is measurable with
respect to a coarser-¯eld. This means that the additional information
provided by the ¯ner ¯eld is not valuable and the outcome is compatible
with the coarser information. In this case, conditioning directly on the
coarser ¯eld would result in the same function.
197 Independence of Non-Additive Probabili-
ties and Nash Equilibrium
Extending the notion of independence to the context of non-additive proba-
bilities is an important issue. The main motivation for this extension is Nash
equilibrium.
Let Ai be the set of actions of player i, i = 1;:::;n and let ui : £n
i=1Ai ! I R
be player i's utility function. Suppose that player i randomly chooses an
action in Ai with respect to a non-additive probability Pi. This probability
need not be the actual distribution according to which she randomly selects
her action. The probability Pi might be the distribution that guides her
choice as perceived by other players or by an outside observer.
The notion of Nash equilibrium assumes that players choose their action
independently.
7.1 Independence of non-additive probabilities
The knowledge of each player, beyond the description of the game, consists
solely of her action. Independence of Pi would therefore mean that the knowl-
edge of her own action does not change her belief regarding the probability
over other players' actions. In terms of conditional probability it means that
probability over other players' actions, conditional on any subset of player
i's actions, coincides with the unconditional distribution.
Let A¡i = £j6=iAi and let Fi be the partition of A whose atoms are
fag £ A¡i, a 2 Ai. The partition Fi represents the knowledge available to
player i.
De¯nition 2 A probability P over A realizes Pi; i = 1;:::;n, as independent
probabilities if
(a) for every i and every C µ Ai, P(C £ A¡i) = Pi(C); and
(b) for every D µ A¡i, P(D £ AijFi) = P(D £ Ai):
20In order for Pi; i = 1;:::;n, to be realized as independent probabilities,
there must be a probability P over the product space, A, that satis¯es two
conditions. Condition (a) states that the marginal of P over Ai coincides
with Pi. Condition (b) states that knowing Fi, player i does not change
her belief about others' actions. In other words, the conditional probability
knowing Fi, Pi(DjFi), coincides with the original probability, Pi(DjT ):
Note that in the additive case, there is a unique probability that realizes
Pi; i = 1;:::;n, as independent probabilities. This is the product probability.
However, in the non-additive case, typically, the product probability will not
realize Pi; i = 1;:::;n as independent probabilities.
At this point I have no proof of the conjecture that for any probabili-
ties Pi; i = 1;:::;n, there is P over A that realizes them as independent.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that there is a unique probability that does
it.
The de¯nition of independence of non-additive probabilities paves the
way to the de¯nition of Nash equilibrium. The next subsection take this
direction one step (not more) further.
7.2 A remark on Nash equilibrium with non-additive
probabilities
Nash equilibrium requires, on top of incentive compatibility conditions that
players would choose their actions independently of each other. When playing
the mixed action Pi,3 player i's payo® is E(uijFi), where the expectation
is taken with respect to a probability P that realized the (non-additive)
mixed actions Pi; i = 1;:::;n, as independent. Note that in case there are
multiple probabilities that realize Pi; i = 1;:::;n, as independent, there may
be multiple expected payo®s with the same set of mixed actions.
In equilibrium, E(uijFi) should be greater than or equal to the expected
payo® guaranteed by any speci¯c action a 2 Ai. However, given the action
a 2 Ai, all other players still select their actions independently of each other.
21Thus, The payo® associated with action a 2 Ai is the expectation of player i's
payo® taken with respect to a probability that realizes (Pj)j6=i as independent.
A precise de¯nition of Nash equilibrium and a discussion of this notion
are beyond the scope of this paper and therefore will not be presented here.
8 Final Comments and Further Problems
8.1 The Choquet integral is not essential for the de¯-
nition
We have de¯ned the conditional expectation based on the traditional Cho-
quet integral. In fact, one can de¯ne the conditional expectation, over every
partition, based on the conditional expectation on the trivial partition. Once
the conditional expectation on the trivial ¯eld is de¯ned, the general condi-
tional expectation can be de¯ned as the measurable function (with respect
to the partition under consideration), which minimizes the distance (induced
by the conditional over the trivial ¯eld), to the original function. As long
as the conditional on the trivial ¯eld owns the necessary desirable proper-
ties, whether by the Choquet integral or otherwise, the general conditional
expectation will possess properties (A1)-(A10).
8.2 Vector-valued probabilities
We have seen that the conditional probability of an event B given A, depends
on the partition of the complement of A. In fact, the conditional probability
does not depend only on the conditioned event, but rather on the condi-
tioned partition. This suggests a re-evaluation of the concept of probability.
Instead of a numeric value attached to each event given another one, the
approach of de¯ning the conditional probability as a conditional expectation
suggests that \generalized conditional probability" ought to associate to ev-
ery partition P and event B a P-measurable function. In other words, the
\generalized conditional probability" must be vector-valued. The tradi-
22tional numeric probability must be considered then as a special case: the
probability conditioned on the trivial ¯eld, T .
8.3 The value of information
Consider the value of information in the following additive case. A decision
maker is informed of the atom of a partition and selects an action. In or-
der to maximize his expected utility he chooses the action that entails the
highest expected utility conditional on the prevailing atom. The value of
information in this case is, thus, the incremental utility derived from know-
ing the partition. In other words, the value of a partition is the additional
utility, compared to knowing nothing, of knowing the atom containing the
realized state of nature, once it is realized. As was shown by Gilboa and
Lehrer (1991), in the additive case, this value can be expressed as an addi-
tive function over the atoms. This fact has been used to axiomatize the value
of information in the additive case.
Now that the conditional expectation is de¯ned also for non-additive
probabilities, one may extend the discussion about the value of informa-
tion to the non-additive case. In such a case, the value of information is no
longer an additive function over the atoms. This makes the analysis more
challenging.
8.4 Comonotonicity and the conditional expectation
The following de¯nition is due to Schmeidler (1989).
De¯nition 3 Let X and Y be two random variables. X and Y are comono-
tonic if for every !1;!2;2 ­, X(!1) ¸ X(!2) if and only if Y (!1) ¸ Y (!2).
Schmeidler (1989) stated an axiom that requires that if X and Y are comono-
tonic, then E(X + Y ) = E(X) + E(Y ). One may require that if X and Y
are comonotonic, then, E(X + Y jF) = E(XjF) + E(Y jF). The conditional
expectation de¯ned above does not satisfy this property.
238.5 An axiomatic approach
It would be interesting to ¯nd a set of appealing axioms that characterize
unconditional and conditional expectations with non-additive probabilities.
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